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STATE ANTI-STRIKEBREAKER LAWS:
UNCONSTITUTIONAL INTERFERENCE
WITH EMPLOYERS' RIGHT TO SELF-HELP
L Walter Fisher*
James J. McDonald, Jr. **
More than half of the states today have laws that impede or in
some way regulate the hiring of replacements for striking employees.1 The extent of such regulation varies. Some states impose blanket prohibitions upon the hiring of certain kinds of striker replacements, 2 while others require only that striker replacement recruits be
informed that a labor dispute is in progress at their new place of
employment.3 Most states which ,have anti-strikebreaker laws provide misdemeanor criminal penalties, including fines and imprisonment, for their violation.
Recently, however, a growing number of courts have struck
down state anti-strikebreaker laws as unconstitutional. Courts in
New Jersey, 4 Michigan 5 and Illinois 6 have invalidated laws regulat*B.S., B.A., University of Florida; LL.B., Atlanta Law School; Partner, Fisher & Phillips, Atlanta, Georgia.
**B.A., New College of the University of South Florida; J.D., Georgetown University;
Associate, Fisher & Phillips, Atlanta, Georgia.
I. Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North
Dakota, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin. See supra text accompanying notes 14-22.
2. Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New
Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Wisconsin. See supra text accompanying notes 14-20.
3. California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Texas. See supra text accompanying note 21.
4. Chamber of Commerce v. State, 89 N.J. 131, 445 A.2d 353 (1982).
5. UAW v. C.M. Smillie Co., 139 Mich. App. 731, 362 N.W.2d 780 (1984); Michigan
Chamber of Commerce v. State, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2887 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1984).
6. People v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3320 (C.D. Il. 1982),
vacatedfor lack of subject matter jurisdiction,704 F.2d 935 (7th Cir. 1983) (See supra text
accompanying note 189); People v. Federal Tool & Plastics, 62 IIl. 2d 549, 344 N.E.2d 1
(1975).
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ing the hiring of striker replacements. While courts 7 and commentators8 have advanced several grounds for the constitutional invalidity
of such laws, chief among them is that they are pre-empted by the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).9 This pre-emption theory

holds that state anti-strikebreaker laws interfere with an employer's
right, protected by the federal labor laws, to engage in economic
self-help during a strike by hiring replacements for striking employees."" This article will examine the various state anti-strikebreaker
laws and the states' experiences in enforcing these laws. It will also
explore the development of the doctrine of pre-emption in the context of labor law and the trend among courts toward invalidating
anti-strikebreaker laws on the basis of this doctrine. It will also offer
an appraisal of the validity of various anti-strikebreaker laws under
the pre-emption doctrine.
I.

ANTI-STRIKEBREAKER LAWS TODAY

Pennsylvania enacted the first state anti-strikebreaker law in
1937.11 In 1960, the International Typographical Union, following a
series of strike defeats as a result of newspapers' use of trained
striker replacements, drafted a model "citizens' job protection bill"
which it distributed to state legislatures. 12 Through joint efforts of
the ITU, the AFL-CIO and other labor groups in the 1960s, antistrikebreaker legislation was enacted in several states.
Today approximately one-half of the states have laws that regu7. See, e.g., Alton Box Board Co. v. City of Alton, 65 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1 52, 575 (S.D.
I1. 1971) (prosecution of employer under ordinance prohibiting recruitment of strikebreakers
enjoined as violation of employer's due process and equal protection rights); Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2887 (1984) (statute prohibiting importation or supplying from outside the state of striker replacements held also to violate commerce clause);
State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561 (1952) (statute requiring striker replacements
to register with Utah Industrial Commission held unconstitutionally vague).
8. Comment, Anti-Strikebreaking Legislation-The Effect and Validity of State-Imposed Criminal Sanctions, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 190 (1966) (discussing validity of anti-strikebreaker laws in light of due process, vagueness and commerce clause requirements); Note,
New Jersey Statute ProhibitsImportation of Replacements for Strikers, or Recruitment of
Replacements by Persons Not Involved in the Strike, 77 HARV. L. REv. 377 (1963) (discussion of validity of New Jersey statute under commerce clause and privileges and immunities
clause of the fourteenth amendment).
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982). The Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1982),
governing railroads and airlines, would have a pre-emptory effect similar to that of the NLRA.
See infra note 76.
10. This right is not expressly set forth in the NLRA. Rather, it was recognized by the
Supreme Court in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
11. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 217.23 (Purdon Supp. 1985). See generally Comment,
Anti-Strikebreaking Legislation, supra note 8, at 191 n.7.
12. Comment, Anti-StrikebreakingLegislation, supra note 8, at 190-91.
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late or prohibit the hiring of striker replacements. Louisiana, Michigan, New Jersey and Washington prohibit the importation of any
employee into the state for the purpose of replacing strikers.1 Arkansas, California, Delaware, Hawaii, Louisiana and New Jersey
bar third parties not involved in the labor dispute from recruiting,
procuring, supplying or referring any person for employment in the
place of a striking employee.14
Other states only prohibit the hiring or referral of "professional
strikebreakers," employees who "customarily and repeatedly" offer
themselves as replacements for strikers.15 Although many states fail
to define the term "customarily and repeatedly," a few provide more
precise definitions of the term "professional strikebreaker." Connecticut, for example, defines a "professional strikebreaker" as "any person who has been employed anywhere two or more times in the same
craft or industry in place of employees involved in strikes or lockouts.""' Wisconsin's prohibition of the hiring and referral of "strikebreakers" only applies to individuals who have served as striker
replacements during the previous twelve-month period. 17 California
defines a "professional strikebreaker" as an individual who has been
employed as a striker replacement on three or more previous occasions by two or more employers in the preceding five years. 8
In addition to placing restrictions upon employers and referral
services, many states directly prohibit the "professional strikebreaker" or one who "customarily and repeatedly" offers himself as
a striker replacement from accepting employment as a replacement
for a striking employee.19 The "professional strikebreaker," as well
13.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN.

(West 1978); N.J.
49.44.100 (1962).

STAT. ANN.

§ 23:902 (West 1985); MICH. CohP. LAWs ANN. § 423.253
§ 34:13C-1(c) (West 1965); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §

14. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1028(9) (1976); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 9902(c)(4)
(West 1975); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 703(a) (1979); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 379-2(1)
(1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 23:901A (West 1964); N.J. STAT. ANN § 34:13C-2 (West
1965).
15. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-48a(a) (West 1972); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 379-2(2)
(1976); ILL ANN. STAT, ch. 48, § 2f (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); IowA CODE ANN. § 732.6
(West 1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 26, § 852 (1974); MD. ANN. CODE, art. 100, § 51A(a)
(1979); MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 423.251 (West 1978); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-33-201, 02 (1985); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. § 275-A:1 (1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 40, § 199.1
(Vest Supp. 1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 6622.215(1) (1981); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 217.23
(Supp. 1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-10-10 (1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 103.545 (West Supp.
1984).
16. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-48a(a).
17. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 103.545(1)(b).
18. CAL LAB. CODE § 1133 (West 1971).
19. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-48a(a); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 379-2(3) (1976); ME.
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as the struck employer, is liable for violations of anti-strikebreaker
laws.20 A number of states require employers who advertise for
striker replacements, and employment agencies and other third parties that refer individuals for employment as striker replacements, to
notify the new employees in writing of the existence of the strike or
21
labor dispute.
In addition to state laws, there are a number of municipal ordinances which prohibit or regulate the hiring of striker replacements.22 Most notable is a New York City ordinance 23 which makes
it "unlawful for. . . any employer. . . to employ any strikebreaker
to replace employees who are . . . on strike. '24 A "strikebreaker" is
defined as one who "customarily and repeatedly offers himself for
employment for the duration of a strike or lockout" in the place of
striking employees.2 5 One of the few reported cases involving a prosecution of an employer for violating an anti-strikebreaker law arose
out of this ordinance. In People v. Eastern Airlines,26 Eastern Airlines was prosecuted for replacing striking flight engineers at its
Idlewild (now John F. Kennedy) Airport facility. The court upheld
the validity of the ordinance generally but found Eastern Airlines
not guilty on the basis of the evidence in the case. The court specifically avoided the pre-emption issue, however, leaving that question
REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 26, § 854 (1974); MD. ANN. CODE, art, 100, § 51A(b) (1979); MIcu.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.252 (West 1978); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-33-202(1); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. ch. 275-A:2 (1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 199.2 (West Supp 1984); OR,
REv. STAT. § 662.225 (1981); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 217.23(b).
20. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-48a(a) (West 1972); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 3794(1976); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 26, § 856 (1974); MD. ANN. CODE, art. 100, § 51 A(c)
(1979); MICH. COmp. LAWS ANN. § 423.254 (West 1978); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-33-205
(1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 275-A:5 (Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 199.4
(West Supp. 1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 662. 992 (1981); 43 PA. CONS. STAT ANN. § 217.26
(Purdon 1985).
21. CAL LAB. CODE § 973 (West 1971); COLO. RE. STAT. § 8-2-104 (1974); CONN,
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-121 (West 1978); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 379-3 (1976); ILL ANN. STAT.,
ch. 48, § 2c (Smith-Hurd 1969); IND. CODE ANN. § 25-16-1-12 (Burns 1980); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 732.6(3); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.253a (West 1978); MONT. CODE ANN, § 3933-204 (1983); N.H. RE. STAT. ANN. ch. 275-A:3 (1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-13-15(10)
(1980); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4143.12(D) (Page 1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 199.3
(Supp. 1984); OR. RED.STAT. § 662.215(a); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-10-9 (1979); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 50-1-102(a)(2) (1983); TEx. LAB. CODE ANN., art. 5221a-7, § 3(a)(10) (Vernon Supp.
1985).
22. A list of such municipalities may be found in Comment, Anti-Strikebreaking Legislation, supra note 8, at 191 n.8.
23. N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE tit. A, ch. 42, § 900 (1984).
24. Id. at § 900-2.0(a).
25. Id. at § 900-1.0(a)(6).
26. 46 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 50,739 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol3/iss1/3

4

1985]

Fisher and McDonald:
State Anti-Strikebreaker Laws: Unconstitutional Interference with
State Anti-Strikebreaker
Laws

to "more sophisticated tribunals.
II.

' 27

THE DOCTRINE OF LABOR LAW PRE-EMPTION

Although substantial restrictions upon employers' right to employ replacements for striking employees exist in a significant number of states, these laws conflict with the freedoms rooted in the
supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution,"' and reserved to employers by the federal labor laws. A doctrine of federal pre-emption
2 to the field of labor law has developed over recent decades.
uniqueO9
This doctrine holds generally that the states may not interfere with
the scheme that Congress has established to regulate labor relations.
Underlying this doctrine is a concern for uniformity manifest both in
a single body of federal labor law and in a single enforcement mechanism, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).3 ° While this
common theme of a uniform national labor policy runs throughout
all labor pre-emption cases, two distinct theories, or tests, of labor
law pre-emption have emerged: the Garmon31 theory and the Machinists32 theory.
A.

The Garmon Theory

In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,33 the Court
established the rule3 4 that state statutes or regulations, or state law27. Id. at 62,233.
28. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby .... U.S CONsT. art. VI, cl.2.
29. See generally Cox, Recent Developments in Federal Labor Law Preemption, 41
OHIo ST. L.J. 277 (1980); Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337
(1972).
30. Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be enforced by
any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the parties. It went on to confide
primary interpretation and application of its rules to a specific and specially constituted tribunal and prescribed a particular procedure for investigation, complaint
and notice, and hearing and decision, including judicial relief pending a final administrative order. Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive rules and to avoid those diversities and conflicts likely to result from a
variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies. . . .A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of substantive law.
Garner v. Teamsters, Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953).
31. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
32. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
33. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
34. Id. at 245.
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based causes of action, are pre-empted if they concern conduct that
is either protected by Section 7 of the NLRA 5 or prohibited by Section 8 of the NLRA. 6 In Garmon, a union picketed a business in
order to force the employer to enter a union shop agreement. The
state court found the picketing to constitute a tort under California
law as well as an unfair labor practice under the California Labor
Code,3 7 and awarded damages. The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the possibility that such picketing was either protected by
Section 7 or prohibited as an unfair labor practice under Section 8 of
the NLRA would be sufficient to deprive the state courts of
jurisdiction."
The Garmon rule of pre-emption is not absolute, however. The
Court in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Coun3 9 treated the Garmon rule as only a presumption;
cil of Carpenters,
that is, a state statute, regulation or cause of action is presumed to
be pre-empted if it addresses conduct actually or arguably prohibited
by Section 8 of the NLRA. This presumption may be overcome,
however, if the conduct involved is (1) of only "peripheral concern"
to the federal law and (2) "touch[es] interests . . . deeply rooted in
local feeling and responsibility."40 Sears concerned an alleged violation of state trespass laws, which the Court determined was properly
within the jurisdiction of the state court to enjoin. The Court like35. Section 7 provides in relevant part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection ....
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
36. Section 8(a) provides in relevant part that:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
(i) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section [7];

(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it... ;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization... ;
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed
charges or given testimony under this [Act];
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982).

37. Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 49 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d 473 (1955),
rev'd 359 U.S. 236 (1958).
38. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245.
39. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
40. Id. at 188-89 n.13 (citation omitted).
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wise has not invalidated under the pre-emption doctrine state laws
concerning such issues of local concern as strike violence,4 ' mass
picketing,42 malicious libel,43 and intentional infliction of emotional
44
distress.
B. The Machinists Theory
As situations have arisen that have not fit neatly into the Garmon scheme, a second theory of labor law pre-emption has emerged.
In International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board (Briggs & Stratton Corp.),45 the union, in order to exert pressure on the employer during contract negotiations, adopted a plan
under which special union meetings would be called repeatedly during working hours. After twenty-six such meetings, the employer obtained a cease-and-desist order against such activity from the state
labor relations authority. 46 The Supreme Court allowed the state action to stand, reasoning that since "intermittent, unannounced
[work] stoppages" were neither forbidden nor sanctioned by federal
law, the state police power was not superseded by the NLRA.47
The Briggs & Stratton rule was eroded, however, as the case
law developed. In Garnerv. Teamsters, Local 776,48 union members
picketed an employer in an attempt to force recognition of the union
as collective bargaining representative. A state court of equity
granted an injunction against the picketing,49 partly to avoid the risk
that the less immediate procedures of the NLRB would not prevent
imminent and irreparable damage. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's reversal of the injunction5" was affirmed by a Supreme Court
decision that the matter was within the sole jurisdiction of the
NLRB. 51 The Court also suggested for the first time that certain
picketing, though not explicitly protected activity under the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA), might still have been intended
by Congress to be free from judicial interference. 52 Garner thus rec41.

United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).

42.

UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958).

43.

Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966).

44.
45.

Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
336 U.S. 245 (1949).

46. Id. at 250 n.8.
47. Id. at 264-65.
48. 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
49. Garner v. Teamsters, Local Union No. 776, 62 Dauphin County Rep. 339 (1951).
50. Garner v. Teamsters, Local Union No. 776, 373 Pa. 19, 94 A.2d 893 (1951), aff'd,
346 U.S. 485 (1953).

51. Garner, 346 U.S. at 501.
52. The detailed prescription [in the LMRA] of a procedure for restraint of speci-
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ognized that Congress intended to protect the use of certain means
of self-help although it did not expressly provide for such protection
by statute.
The Court explicitly recognized a union's right to engage in economic self-help activity in support of its collective bargaining demands, even though such activity is not expressly protected by the
NLRA, in NLRB v. Insurance Agents' InternationalUnion." In In-

surance Agents, the union commenced a number of tactics designed
to harass the employer during negotiations for a new contract.5 The
employer filed a grievance under Section 8(b)(3) 5 5 charging that the
union refused to bargain. The NLRB ordered the union to cease and
desist.56
I The Supreme Court reversed the Board.57 It held that the
NLRB is not empowered to regulate the economic self-help methods
that a union might seek to undertake where such tactics are not expressly prohibited by the NLRA.5 8 The Court concluded by observing that the national labor policy does not contain a charter for the
NLRB to "act at large in equalizing disparities of bargaining power
between employer and union."5 9
fled types of picketing would seem to imply that other picketing is to be free of
other methods and sources of restraint. For the policy of the National Labor Management Relations Act is not to condemn all picketing but only that ascertained by
its prescribed processes to fall within its prohibitions. Otherwise, it is implicit in the
Act that the public interest is served by freedom of labor to use the weapon of
picketing. For a state to impinge on the area of labor combat designed to be free is
quite as much an obstruction of federal policy as if the state were to declare picketing free for purposes or by methods which the federal Act prohibits.
Garner, 346 U.S. at 499-500.
53. 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
54. These tactics included refusals to solicit new business, reporting late for work, leaving at noon as a group and engaging in "sit-in mornings" and "doing what comes naturally."
Id. at 480-81.
55. Section 8(b)(3) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization "to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1982).
56. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 768, 41 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1176
(1957).
57. NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
58. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. at 498-99. The Court reasoned that if the NLRB could
declare that certain forms of economic pressure constitute bad faith bargaining,
the Board in the guise of determining good or bad faith in negotiations could regulate what economic weapons a party might summon to its aid. And if the Board
could regulate the choice of economic weapons that may be used as part of collection bargaining, it would be in a position to exercise considerable influence upon the
substantive terms on which the parties contract.
Id. at 490. The Court did not, however, decide whether or not the union's tactics were protected under the NLRA. Id. at 483 n.6.
59. Id.
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In Teamsters, Local 20 v. Morton, 0 an employer sued a union
for damages suffered as the result of the union's secondary activities

directed at the employer's suppliers and customers during a strike.
The federal district court awarded the employer damages, 61 pursuant

to section 303 of the LMRA6 2 based on a finding that the union had
encouraged employees of a supplier and a customer to force their
employers to ceases doing business with the struck employer.6 a As a
result of the union's appeal to another of the employer's customers,
the court also awarded damages under Ohio common law that pro-

hibited "making direct appeals to a struck employer's customers or
' Thus,
suppliers to stop doing business with the struck employer."64
Ohio law banned appeals to a struck employer's customers and suppliers themselves, while the NLRA prohibits only appeals to employees of such customers and suppliers.
The Supreme Court in Morton ruled that the district court's
award of damages pursuant to Ohio common law was invalid under
the pre-emption doctrine. 65 It found Congress' decision to proscribe
only appeals to employees of secondary employers an indication of
its intention to leave the remainder of the field of secondary activity
open and available to unions. 66 The Court thus concluded that while
60. 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
61. Morton v. Teamsters, Local 20, 200 F. Supp. 653, 661 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
62. Section 303 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1982) provides a damage remedy to
anyone injured as the result of a union's secondary boycott activity that is prohibited by
§ 8(b)(4) of the NLRA. Section 8(b)(4) provides in relevant part that it shall be an unfair
labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person
engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or
a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or
otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to
perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in
commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object
thereof is(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or
otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer,
or to cease doing business with any other person. ...
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
63. Morton v. Teamsters, Local 20, 200 F. Supp. at 659.
64. Id. at 656, 661.
65. Teamsters, Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 260 (1964).
66. The Court stated:
This weapon of self-help, permitted by federal law, formed an integral part of the
petitioner's effort to achieve its bargaining goals during negotiations ....Allowing
its use is a part of the balance struck by Congress between the conflicting interests
of the union, the employees, the employer and the community ....If the Ohio law
of secondary boycott can be applied to proscribe the same type of conduct which
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choosing to proscribe only some forms of secondary activity, Congress nonetheless had occupied the entire field and had closed it to
state regulation.
The Court synthesized many of these cases, and formally established a second theory of labor law preemption, in Lodge 76, International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission ("Machinists")." In
Machinists, after the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, the employer unilaterally implemented its proposal for a fortyhour workweek and an eight-hour day. The union responded by
adopting a resolution requiring all members to refuse to work overtime, defined as work in excess of seven and one-half hours per day
or thirty-seven and one-half hours per week. The employer filed a
section 8(b)(3) 68 charge against the union, which was dismissed by
the Regional Director on the authority of Insurance Agents.69 The
employer then filed a complaint with the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, charging that the refusal to work overtime was
an unfair labor practice under state law. The Commission denied the
union's motion to dismiss on pre-emption grounds, maintaining that
the concerted refusal to work overtime was neither arguably protected by section 7 nor arguably prohibited under section 8, and thus
70
was not preempted.
The Supreme Court reversed,7 1 interpreting the state's action
not as "filling a regulatory void" left by Congress, but as interference in the substantive aspects of the collective bargaining process
72
that Congress had not intended to permit.
Congress focused upon but did not proscribe when it enacted § 303, the inevitable
result would be to frustrate the congressional determination to leave this weapon of
self-help available, and to upset the balance of power between labor and management expressed in our national labor policy.
Id. at 259-60.
67. 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
68. See supra note 55.
69. 361 U.S. 477.
70. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 135.
71. Id. at 136.

72. The employer in this case invoked the Wisconsin law because it was unable to
overcome the Union tactic with its own economic self-help means. Although it did
employ economic weapons putting pressure on the Union when it terminated the
previous agreement . . . it apparently lacked sufficient economic strength to secure
its bargaining demands under "the balance of power between labor and management expressed in our national labor policy." But the economic weakness of the
affected party cannot justify state aid contrary to federal law for, as we have developed, "the use of economic pressure by the parties to a labor dispute is not a grudging exception [under] . . .the [federal] Act; it is part and parcel of the process of
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Briggs & Stratton" was specifically overruled by Machinists.74
By so doing, the Court formally acknowledged that action by any
governmental authority, including state and federal courts and the
NLRB, will be pre-empted if it regulates the choice of economic
weapons that may be used in the course of collective bargaining. 75
Thus, economic self-help activity need not specifically be protected
under section 7 of the NLRA, nor already prohibited under section
76
8, to be protected from state regulation.
An important distinction exists between these two categories of
protection, however. Section 7 protects employees from employer reprisals for engaging in activity which the NLRB and the courts have
deemed to have been covered by Congress in enacting section 7.7
The Machinists theory of pre-emption, by contrast, only protects
such activity against attempts by the states or other governmental
authorities to regulate or prohibit it; it does not protect employees
themselves from the consequences of their undertaking such activity.
Therefore, an employer's right to discharge or discipline employees
for engaging in sit-down strikes, 78 or disloyal activities,7 9 for example, remains unaffected by the doctrine of pre-emption.
The Machinists theory of pre-emption was again at issue in
New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Department of Labor,80 in which some members of the Court unsuccessfully sought to
modify that theory. New York Telephone involved a pre-emption
claim against a New York law that authorized payment of unemployment insurance benefits to strikers.8 ' Since these benefits were
collective bargaining."
Id. at 148-49 (footnotes and citations omitted).
73.

International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. (Briggs &

Stratton Corp.), 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
74.

Machinists, 427 U.S. at 154.

75. Id. at 153-54.
76.

The right to engage in economic self-help activity similarly is protected against state

encroachment under the Railway Labor Act (RLA). For example, in Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969), the Court ruled that state courts

cannot enjoin economic self-help activity, including secondary boycotts, even though the RLA
does not delineate which kinds of economic self-help are to be allowed and which are to be
barred.

77. See, e.g., NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963) (right to strike);
NLRB v. Teamsters, Local 639, 362 U.S. 274 (1960) (right to form and join labor organiza-

tion); NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967) (right to refuse unsafe
work).
78. See NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
79. See NLRB v. Electrical Workers, 346 U.S. 464 (1953).
80. 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
81. Section 592(1) of the New York Labor Law provides that a person unemployed
because of a "strike, lockout, or other industrial controversy in the establishment in which he
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financed largely through employer contributions,8 2 struck employers
found themselves providing funding for their opposition.
While the Court upheld the New York law, there was no majority opinion and members of the Court differed sharply over the reasons for validating the law and the meaning of the Machinists theory. A plurality of the Court, consisting of Justices Stevens, White
and Rehnquist, first recognized that the New York law had altered
the economic balance between labor and management.8 3 The plurality distinguished the New York law from those laws applied in Morton and Machinists, asserting that the New York law had been
designed to distribute benefits to certain members of the society, not
to regulate private conduct in the field of labor relations.8 4 Moreover,
the plurality found that the enactment of the NLRA in 1935 expressed no congressional intent to deny to the states the power to
provide unemployment benefits to strikers. The Court noted that the
Social Security Act,8" also enacted in 1935, provides that states may
not deny compensation to an otherwise qualified applicant because
he has refused to work as a strikebreaker,8 ' and that, in considering
the Social Security Act, Congress rejected suggestions by certain citizens and business groups that states be prohibited from providing
unemployment compensation benefits to strikers. 7
The New York Telephone plurality sought to modify the Machinists theory of pre-emption in two critical respects.8 8 First, according to Machinists, states are presumed to be prohibited from
regulating self-help activity even though such activity is not specifically protected under section 7 of the NLRA. This presumption may
be rebutted only by an express Congressional purpose to allow state
was employed," becomes eligible for unemployment insurance benefits seven weeks after his
employment terminates due to such labor dispute. N.Y. Lab. Law § 592(l) (McKinney 1977).
82. Id. at §§ 570(1), 581.
83. 440 U.S. 531-32.

84. Id. at 532.
85. 26 U.S.C. § 3301 (1982) (Amended and recodified as the Federal Unemployment
Tax Act).
86. See 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(5) (1982).
87. 440 U.S. at 543 n.41. The Court also noted that on two previous occasions Congress
had considered and rejected amendments to existing laws that would have denied unemployment benefits to strikers. In 1947, the House version of the LMRA would have denied § 7
rights to any striker who accepted unemployment compensation benefits. The Senate rejected
this provision and it was deleted by the Conference Committee. In 1969, the Nixon Administration proposed an amendment to the Social Security Act to exclude strikers from unemployment compensation eligibility. Congress also rejected this proposal. Id. at n.44.
88. For a discussion of the vitality of Machinists after New York Telephone, see McDonald, State Plant Closing Laws: Pre-Empted by the NLRA?, 10 EMPL REL L.J. 241, 254-

56 (1984).
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regulation. 89 Thus, for example, in the Fair Labor Standards Act, 90
while Congress has established minimum wages and a maximum
workweek to apply nationwide, it also has explicitly provided that

states may set minimum wages higher than the federal minimum or
a maximum workweek lower than the federal maximum. 9' Similarly,

in Malone v. White Motor Corp.,92 the Court upheld state pension
regulations because it found that Congress, prior to enacting the

Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 93 had expressly recog94
nized and preserved state authority to regulate pension plans.

The New York Telephone plurality, however, sought to shift the
Machinists presumption of pre-emption that is to be inferred from
Congressional silence in the area of economic self-help activity. The
plurality held that Congress' silence on the issue of payments to
strikers implies that it intended that states be free to authorize or

prohibit such payments, even where such payments may alter the
economic balance between labor and management.95
The remaining Justices (a majority of the Court) declined to
adopt the plurality's approach in New York Telephone. Justices
Blackmun and Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, concurred in the

result, finding that New York's law was valid. 6 They expressly refused to alter the Machinists principle that state regulation of eco-

nomic self-help activity is pre-empted unless Congress expressly intends to allow such regulation. 97 The concurring Justices upheld the
89. Id. at 254.
90. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1982).
91. 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) (1982).
92. 435 U.S. 497 (1978).
93. 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461 (1982).
94. 435 U.S. at 505. The Court found such intent to be manifest in various provisions of
the federal Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, formerly codified at 29 U.S.C. § 301309 (1976). The Disclosure Act was expressly repealed by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA). 29 U.S.C. § 1031(a)(1) (1982).
95. [T]here is no evidence that the Congress that enacted the National Labor Relations Act in 1935 intended to deny the states the power to provide unemployment
benefits for strikers. Far from the compelling congressional direction on which preemption in this case would have to be predicated, the silence of Congress in 1935
actually supports the contrary inference that Congress intended to allow the states
to make this policy determination for themselves.
New York Telephone Co. v. New York Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 540 (1979) (emphasis
added; footnote and citation omitted).
96. Id. at 547-51. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
97. Justice Blackmun wrote:
This requirement that petitioners must demonstrate "compelling congressional
direction" in order to establish pre-emption is not, I believe, consistent with the preemption principles laid down in Machinists .... I believe Machinists compels the
conclusion that Congress intended to pre-empt such state activity, unless there is
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New York law, however, because they found sufficient evidence in
the legislative history of Congress' intent to allow states to provide
unemployment compensation to strikers.98 Dissenting Justices Powell
and Stewart and Chief Justice Burger likewise refused to break from
the Machinists rule, and voted to invalidate the New York law because they found insufficient evidence of Congress' intent to allow
states to pay unemployment compensation benefits to strikers. 99
The New York Telephone plurality additionally attempted,
again unsuccessfully, to import an intent requirement into the Machinists test. It found New York's law to be one of "general applicability" designed to ensure employment security.100 The unemployment compensation law, according to the plurality, was valid because
it was not intended to regulate bargaining relationships between
management and labor.101
The remainder of the Court rejected this analysis, however. Justice Blackmun wrote that "[t]he crucial inquiry is whether the exercise of state authority 'frustrate[s] effective implementation of the
Act's processes,' not whether the State's purpose was to confer a
benefit on a class of citizens." 102 The dissenting Justices agreed, stating, "The Court has recognized

. . .

that preemption must turn not

on the generality of purpose or applicability of a state law but on the
effect of that law when applied in the context of labor-management
'10 3
relations.
Thus, a majority of the Court rejected the plurality's attempt to
modify the Machinists doctrine, Machinists survived New York
Telephone and its principles remain good law. 0 State regulation of
evidence of congressional intent to tolerate it.

The difference between Machinists and this case, it seems to me, is in the initial premise. In the present case, the plurality appears to be saying that there is no
pre-emption unless "compelling congressional direction" indicates otherwise, The
premise is therefore one of assumed priority on the state side. In Machinists, on the
other hand, the Court said, I thought, that there is pre-emption unless there is evidence of congressional intent to tolerate the state practice. That premise, therefore,
is one of assumed priority on the federal side. The distinction is not semantic.
Id. at 548-49 (emphasis added in first paragraph).
98. Id. at 549.
99. Id. at 560-67 (Powell, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 533.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 550 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 558 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
104. The Court has addressed the Machinists doctrine in two cases subsequent to New

York Telephone. In Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983), the Court held that Machinists did not bar suits for misrepresentation and breach of contract by striker replacements who
were promised permanent employment but were subsequently laid off to make way for rein-
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the use of economic self-help methods is presumed to be pre-empted
absent express Congressional intent to the contrary, and a state law's
effect on labor relations, rather than its intended purpose, is

controlling.
III.

PRE-EMPTION AND THE EMPLOYER'S RIGHT TO ECONOMIC
SELF-HELP

Most pre-emption cases have involved attempts by states to restrict unions' ability to engage in economic self-help. The decisions
repeatedly have verified the rights of unions and employees to exert
economic pressure on employers in support of their collective bargaining objectives. 10 5 It is clear, however, that employers enjoy a corresponding right to engage in economic self-help. As the Court in
Machinists illustrated:
resort to economic weapons should more peaceful measures not
avail is the right of the employer as well as the employee and the
State may not prohibit the use of such weapons or "add to an employer's federal legal obligations in collective bargaining" any more
than in the case of employees.10 6

A variety of economic self-help methods are available to an employer, including unilateral implementation of its final offer upon impasse,107 an offensive lockout,108 and subcontracting of bargaining
unit work.10 9
Perhaps the most potent method of self-help available to an employer in the course of an economic strike is permanent replacement
of strikers.11 0 This right was affirmed early in the history of the
stated strikers. The Belknap Court did not attempt to modify the Machinists doctrine, however. In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S. Ct. 2380 (1985), the Court held
that a state law requiring that certain minimum mental health care benefits be provided to
Massachusetts residents covered under employee health insurance policies is not pre-empted
under the Machinists doctrine. The court, however, distinguished between state laws that established minimum labor standards and those that altered the balance of bargaining power
between employer and union. Id. at 2396-98. Thus, while Metropolitan Life may narrow the
Machinists doctrine somewhat with respect to state mandated employee benefits, it in no way
affects the right of employers and unions to engage in economic self-help unhindered by state
regulation under Machinists.
105. E.g., Morton, 377 U.S. at 252; Garner, 346 U.S. at 485.
106. 427 U.S. at 147 (citations omitted).
107. See NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1949). See
also NLRB v. United Nuclear Corp., 381 F.2d 972, 976 (10th Cir. 1967).
108. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
109. E.g., NLRB v. King Radio Corp., 416 F.2d 569 (10th Cir. 1969); Puerto Rico Tel.
Co. v. NLRB, 359 F.2d 983 (1st Cir. 1966).
110. The right to permanently replace striking employees exists only in an economic, as
opposed to an unfair labor practice, strike. In the latter case, strikers must be reinstated imme-
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NLRA, in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co."' In Mackay,

a struck employer brought in replacements from its branches in
other cities. When the strikers offered to return to work, the employer refused to displace those replacements it hired to fill the strikers' jobs. The employer based its choice of those employees who
would not be reinstated, however, upon those employees' union activities. The NLRB found that the employer had violated Sections 8(1)
and 8(3)112 of the NLRA."13

The Supreme Court affirmed the Board's finding that the employer had unlawfully discriminated against those strikers it refused
to reinstate solely because they had been active in the union.114 The
Court denied, however, that it was an unfair labor practice to replace the striking employees in order to carry on the business.1 15 The
right to permanently replace economic strikers has been recognized
repeatedly by courts throughout the history of the NLRA, 16 and
was reaffirmed recently by the Supreme Court in Belknap, Inc. v.
1 17

Hale.

Moreover, the NLRB rule in Hot Shoppes, Inc."" that an employer's motive for hiring permanent replacements is immaterial, absent evidence of some independent unlawful purpose. The Board reversed the trial examiner, who had found that the employer, in
hiring replacements, acted pursuant to a "contrived scheme" to dediately upon their offering to return to work, causing displacement of striker replacements if
necessary. See NLRB v. Pecheur Lozenge Co., 209 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1953).
Ill. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
112. Now §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3). See supra note 36.
113. Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 341.
114. Id. at 346.
115. Although section 13 [of the act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 163] provides, "nothing in this
Act [chapter] shall be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any
way the right to strike," it does not follow that an employer, guilty of no act denounced by the statute, has lost the right to protect and continue his business by
supplying places left vacant by strikers. And he is not bound to discharge those
hired to fill the places of strikers, upon the election of the latter to resume their
employment, in order to create places for them. The assurance by respondent to
those who accepted employment during the strike that if they so desired their places
might be permanent was not an unfair labor practice nor was it such to reinstate
only so many of the strikers as there were vacant places to be filled.
Id. at 345-46 (footnote omitted).
116. E.g., H. & F. Binch Co. v. NLRB, 456 F.2d 357, 361-62 (2d Cir.. 1972); Phillip
Carey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 720, 725 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 888 (1964).
117. 463 U.S. 491 (1983). The Court explained that the refusal to fire permanent
replacements because of commitments made to them in the course of an economic strike satisfies the requirements of NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 380 (1967), that the
employer have a "legitimate and substantial justification" for his refusal to reinstate strikers.
463 U.S. at 504 n.8.
118. 146 N.L.R.B. 802, 55 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1419 (1964).
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feat the strikers' rights to reinstatement."1 9 The Board declared:
"We . . . disagree with the trial examiner's premise that an em-

ployer may replace economic strikers only if it is shown that he acted to preserve efficient operation of his business." 2 ' Thus, a struck

employer need not show that each striker replacement hired is essential to maintaining continued business operations.' 21 In addition to
hiring replacements for primary strikers, employers may likewise replace sympathy
strikers where the primary strike is economic in
122
nature.
Employers also have other rights with respect to hiring striker
replacements. An employer may train striker replacements in anticipation of a strike so long as the trainees do not actually perform
bargaining unit work and the training program does not interfere
with normal operations. 2 a In addition, where necessary to attract a
sufficient number of replacements, an employer may offer compensation at rates higher than those contained in the applicable collective

bargaining agreement. 2 4
IV.

APPLICATIONS OF THE PRE-EMPTION DOCTRINE TO STATE
ANTI-STRIKEBREAKER LAWS

The issue of the validity of anti-strikebreaker laws under the
pre-emption doctrine has been litigated thus far in four states: New
119. Id. at 805, 55 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1420.
120. Id.
121. The rights of airline and railroad employers subject to the Railway Labor Act may
be more limited in this respect. In Empresa Ecuatoriana de Aviacion v. District Lodge No.
100, 690 F.2d 838 (11th Cir. 1982), the court ruled that an RLA carrier may permanently
replace only so many employees as are necessary to continue operations and the federal district
court, in exercising its equitable power, may determine the propriety of each replacement. Id.
at 846. Accord National Airlines v. International Ass'n of Machinists (National Airlines I),
430 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1970). Courts do not impose the NLRA on replacement of strikers
"wholesale into the railway labor arena," because the RLA is "more concerned with the continuance of the employer's operations and the employer-employee relationship" than is the
NLRA. National Airlines v. International Ass'n of Machinists (National Airlines II), 416
F.2d 998, 1004 (5th Cir. 1969).
122. E.g.. NLRB v. Southern Greyhound Lines, 426 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1970). By
contrast, employees who strike in sympathy with an unfair labor practice strike are entitled to
reinstatement at the conclusion of the strike. NLRB v. C.K. Smith & Co., 569 F.2d 162 (1st
Cir. 1977).
123. Teamsters v. World Airways, 99 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 10,600 (N.D. Cal. 1982). See
also San Diego Newspaper Guild v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1977) (striker replacement trainees were not part of bargaining unit and employer was not obligated to provide their
names to union). Cf. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 422 F.2d 593
(7th Cir. 1970) (pre-strike training program unlawful where trainees rode in cabs of operating
locomotives and regular engineers were required to turn the controls over to the trainees and
threatened with discharge if they refused to do so).
124. E.g., Sinclair Glass Co., 188 N.L.R.B. 362, 76 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1289 (1971).
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Jersey,125 Michigan,1 26 Illinois 27 and Louisiana.
A.

28

New Jersey

New Jersey's anti-strikebreaker statute1

29

prohibits importing

into the state any person to replace striking employees or those who
have been locked out.1 30 The statute also prohibits the recruitment,

within the state, of striker replacements, 31 and restricts employment
agencies from referring applicants to employers whose employees are
involved in a strike or lockout.13 2 The statute also prohibits the importation into the state of any person who is to be employed in order
to interfere by force, violence, threats, coercion or intimidation with
lawful picketing,133 or to coerce, intimidate, or interfere by force,
violence or threats with the right of employees
to form, join or assist
34
a union or engage in collective bargaining.
The United States Chamber of Commerce and the New Jersey
Chamber of Commerce brought suit in 1980 for a judgment declaring those sections of the New Jersey statute which prohibit the im125. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. State, 89 N.J. 131, 445 A.2d 353
(1982).
126. UAW v. C.M. Smillie Co., 139 Mich. App. 731, 362 N.W.2d 780 (1984); Michigan Chamber of Commerce v. State, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2887 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1984).
127. State v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3320 (C.D. I1. 1982);
People v. Federal Tool & Plastics, 62 Ill. 2d 549, 344 N.E.2d 1 (1975).
128. Warren v. Louisiana Dep't of Labor, 313 So. 2d 6 (La. Ct. App. 1975).
129. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 34:13C-I (West 1965). The law applies to "any person, firm,
partnership, or corporation."
130. Id. at § 34:13C-1(c) (West 1965).
131. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13 C-2 (West 1965).
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation, not directly involved in a
strike or lockout, to recruit any person or persons for employment, or to secure or
offer to secure for any persons any employment, when the purpose of such recruiting, securing or offering to secure employment, is to have such persons take the
place in employment of employees in an industry where a strike or lockout exists.

Id.
132. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 34:13C-3 (West 1965) provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o...
employment agent, and no person acting on behalf of the New Jersey Employment Service
shall knowingly refer an applicant to an employer any of whose employees are then engaged in
a strike or have been locked out." Id.
133. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13C-1(a) (West 1965) prohibits the importation of any person for the purpose of becoming employed with the object of "interfering by force or violence
or threats thereof, or coercing or intimidating persons lawfully picketing the premises of an
employer or engaged in other lawful activities in support of a strike, during the existence of a
labor dispute." Id.
134. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13C-1(b) (West 1965) likewise prohibits the importation of
any person for the purpose of becoming employed with the object of "coercing or intimidating
or interfering by force or violence or threats thereof with the right of employees to form, join
or assist labor organizations or the rights of employees or their representatives to engage in
collective bargaining with their employers." Id.
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portation,13 5 the recruiting," 6 and the referral by employment agents
of striker replacements

37

to be unconstitutional. 13 The principal ba-

sis for challenging these provisions was the pre-emption doctrine, although challenges to the state laws were additionally brought under

the due process, 139 equal protection,1 40 commerce,1 41 and privileges
and immunities 42 clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The trial court
declared that those sections of the statute which prohibit employer

importation of striker replacements and third-party recruitment of
such replacements were indeed pre-empted as to those employers

and employees covered by the NLRA. 143 Even those sections which
addressed the use of force and violence could not withstand Consti-

tutional attack. The court held that the statutory scheme was not a
valid exercise of the state's police powers. 4
The New Jersey Supreme Court, taking the case on direct certification to the trial court, affirmed on the issue of pre-emption.1 45
1 46
The court applied the theory of pre-emption developed in Morton

and Machinists147 in invalidating the law. 148 The court found that
the state anti-strikebreaker law was "directed specifically at labor135. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13C-1 (c) (West 1965).
136. Id. at § 34:13C-2.
137. Id. at § 34:13C-3.
138. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. State, 104 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2749
(N.J. Sup. 1980), a.ffd in part and modified in part, 89 N.J. 131, 445 A.2d 353, (1982).
139. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .. " U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
140. "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
141.

"The Congress shall have power to.

.

.regulate Commerce.

.

.among the several

States .. " U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8.
142. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States .. " U.S. CONsT. amend., XIV. § 1.
143. 104 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2751.
144. Id.
145. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. State, 89 N.J. 131, 445 A.2d 353
(1982).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 60-66.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 67-79.
148. The statute involved in this case is directly related to the balance of economic
power between labor and management. The right to hire replacements for striking
workers is an economic weapon that can play a significant role in the collective
bargaining process. If available, it strengthens the employer's position. If unavailable, the union's bargaining position would be enhanced. The irresistible conclusion
under the Morton rationale is that the federal framework structuring the economic
balance between employer and union has pre-empted state action that would interfere with, modify, or alter an employer's right to hire replacements for striking
employees.
Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. State, 89 N.J. at 148, 445 A.2d at 361-62.
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management relations, rather than at a general matter of local concern, such as trespass or nuisance. '149 As such, the court noted, the
law contravened the "labor-management economic balance established by the federal Act."150
The New Jersey Supreme Court also found to be pre-empted
those provisions of New Jersey's anti-strikebreaker law"" covering
1 2
parties other than employers who were governed by the NLRA.
Thus, New Jersey's anti-strikebreaker law was held to be preempted

as it applied to employment agencies and similar organizations. 5 3
Finally, the court refused to perform "judicial surgery" in order
to construe the anti-strikebreaker law as valid only when applied to
situations involving force or violence. The court was unable to discern whether the legislature would have enacted so limited a bill. It
reasoned that to apply the statute only in cases involving force or
violence would be impractical, since in many cases strike violence
does not occur until after the employer has hired replacements and
such replacements have attempted to cross the picket line.15 4 The

court however, was willing to apply such a limitation to those employers and employees not covered by the NLRA,155 noting that in149.

Id. at 149, 445 A.2d at 362.

150.

Id.

151. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:13c-2, 3 (West, 1965).
152. Noting that such third parties would be acting on behalf of, or in support of an
employer, the court explained:
This regulation directly affects management practices and is aimed at their control.
The methods an employer sees fit to use in obtaining replacements are part and
parcel of his federal right. The primary effect could be to make replacement virtually impossible for some employers, such as those who had to obtain highly skilled
workers of which there was an insufficient number available in a single area.

89 N.J. at 150, 445 A.2d at 362-63.
153. State employment services, the court pointed out, are still barred from referring
individuals to employers to serve as striker replacements because state employment services
subject to the federal Wagner-Peyser Act, are bound to observe rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor. 29 U.S.C. § 49 (1982). One such regulation promulgated by
the Secretary prohibits state employment agencies from making a job referral
which will aid directly or indirectly in the filling of a job opening which is vacant
because the former occupant is on strike, or is being locked out in the course of a
labor dispute, or the filling of which is otherwise an issue in a labor dispute involving a work stoppage.
20 C.F.R. 652.9(a) (1982).
154. 89 N.J. at 152-53, 445 A.2d at 364.
155. Certain employees are excluded from coverage of the NLRA: agricultural laborers,
domestic servants, independent contractors and supervisory employees. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)
(1982). Moreover, the NLRB has the authority to decline jurisdiction over labor disputes
where the effect on commerce is not substantial. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1982). For example,
the NLRB presently exercises jurisdiction only over employers engaged in retail sales having
annual gross volume in excess of $500,000. Carolina Supplies Cement Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 88,
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dications were strong that the legislature would have enacted such a
limited provision with respect to such individuals. 15

In summary, the New Jersey Supreme Court's treatment of the

pre-emption issue 15 7 indicated that an anti-strikebreaker statute

which directly affects the balance of economic power between labor
and management is pre-empted, in spite of the fact that it may also

advance local interests. The New Jersey court thus considered the
Machinists theory to have been left untouched by New York Telephone. Moreover, the New Jersey Court's pre-emption ruling pre-

vents enforcement of anti-strikebreaker laws against private employment agencies

and

other third

parties who provide

striker

replacements to struck employers, by equating third party recruitment of replacements to recruitment by the struck employer itself.
B. Michigan

The Michigan Strikebreaker Act proscribes a variety of conduct
relating to the recruitment and employment of striker replacements.
It prohibits a struck employer from knowingly employing as a striker

replacement any person who "customarily and repeatedly" offers
himself for hire as a striker replacement. 158 It also restrains a person
who "customarily and repeatedly" works as a striker replacement
from replacing employees involved in a strike or lockout. 59 The law
43 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1060 (1958). In cases where the NLRB does not exercise its jurisdiction,
the states may apply their own laws. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(2) (1982). See Pari-Mutuel Clerks
Union v. Kentucky Jockey Club, 551 S.W.2d 801 (Ky. 1977) (application of state law prohibiting employment discrimination based on union activity to racetrack employer where NLRB
declined to exercise jurisdiction over harness racing industry).
156. 89 N.J. at 154, 445 A.2d at 365.
157. The court additionally ruled that New Jersey's anti-strikebreaker law was valid
under the due process clause, since it bore "a rational relationship to a constitutionally permissible objective" (i.e., the desire to modify the power balance between management and labor),
Id. at 155, 445 A.2d at 365-67, and valid under the equal protection clause, since it was not
"palpably arbitrary or capricious" or completely lacking any rational basis. Id. at 159, 445
A.2d at 367-68. The court held, however, that the anti-strikebreaker provision violated the
commerce clause, since on its face it discriminated against interstate commerce by a prohibition against supplying any person from without the state to a prospective employer within the
state. Id. at 161, 445 A.2d at 368-70.
158. MICH. Coip. LAws ANN. § 423.251 (West 1978) provides:

No person, partnership, firm or corporation, or officer or agent thereof, involved in a
strike or lockout shall knowingly employ in place of an employee involved in the
strike or lockout any person who customarily and repeatedly offers himself for employment in the place of employees involved in a strike or lockout.

Id.
159. Micn. Comp. LAWs ANN. § 423.252 (West 1978) provides: "No person who customarily and repeatedly offers himself for employment in place of employees involved in a
strike or lockout shall take or offer to take the place in employment of employees involved in a
strike or lockout."
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prohibits the importation of any striker replacement into the state,16
and requires that all advertisements for new employees announce the
existence of the strike or lockout. 6 1 A firm or organization who violates the Act is subject to misdemeanor penalties. 6 2
Michigan's Strikebreaker Act has been invalidated on pre-emption grounds by two different courts. In UA W v. C.M. Smillie Co., 63
a union brought suit to enjoin an employer from advertising for
striker replacements in Detroit newspapers without providing sufficient notice of the existence of a strike, in violation of Section 3(a)
of the Act. The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer on the ground that that provision was pre-empted by the
16 4
NLRA.
Citing Morton and Machinists,6 5 the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed.1 66 The court also considered the "state interest" exception to the pre-emption rule under the Garmon test and considered whether the regulated activity touches interests deeply rooted in
local feeling and responsibility.1 67 The court perceived "no state interest that would overcome the presumption of pre-emption."16 8 It
160. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.253 (West 1978) provides:
No person, partnership, firm or corporation, or officer or agent thereof, involved in a
lawful strike or lockout shall hire and import or contract or arrange with any other
person, partnership, agency, firm or corporation to hire and import from another
state or country, for the purpose of strikebreaking, persons for employment in place
of employees involved in the strike or lockout.
id.
161. MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.253(a) (West 1978) provides:
No person, partnership, agency, firm or corporation, or officer or agent thereof, shall
recruit, solicit or advertise for employees, or refer persons to employment, in place
of employees involved in a lawful strike or lockout, without adequate notice to the
person, and in the advertisement, that there is a strike or lockout at the place at
which employment is offered and that the employment offered is in place of employees involved in the strike or lockout.
Id.
162. MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 423.254 (West 1978).
163. 139 Mich. App. 731, 362 N.W.2d 780 (1984).
164. 362 N.W.2d at 781.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 60-79.
166. 362 N.W.2d at 782-83. The Court held:
[w]e believe that advertising for strike replacements cannot realistically be separated from the employer's right to hire replacements, which indisputably is "part
and parcel of the process of collective bargaining" that Congress intended to be
governed by the free play of economic forces ....[R]egulation of advertising directly affects the employer's success in hiring replacements.
362 N.W.2d at 782.
167. 362 N.W.2d at 782. See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego District Council
of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 195 (1978).
168. 362 N.W.2d at 782-83.
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noted that the Strikebreaker Act "cannot be construed as a general
truth-in-advertising act which is designed to protect people from
misleading advertisement schemes. 11169 The court reasoned that a
finding that the Strikebreaker Act is pre-empted would not deny to
employees who had been misled any of the generally applicable remedies for fraud or misrepresentation.17 0 Moreover, the court rejected
the argument that the notice provision was necessary to prevent violence. It noted that if preventing violence was the aim of the notice
requirement, the requirement would apply to all strikes, not just
"lawful" ones. 7 1 The court concluded that the notice provision was
7
pre-empted as it applied to employers governed by the NLRA. 1
In Michigan Chamber of Commerce v. State, 73 the Michigan
Chamber of Commerce sought a declaratory judgment that the entire Michigan Strikebreaker Act was unconstitutional, primarily on
the ground of federal pre-emption.17 4 The state argued that pre-emption was not appropriate since the Strikebreaker Act covered only
"professional strikebreakers.' 75 The court rejected this distinction,
however, finding that even a limitation on the application of the act
to "professional strikebreakers" is "an unacceptable impairment of
the employer/employee balance struck by Congress. It impinges on
the employer's recognized right to hire replacements for striking or
locked out workers.' x76 The court continued that "the reasoning in
Morton prevents any encumbrances from being put on the 77employer's acknowledged right to hire replacements for strikers."'
The Michigan Chamber of Commerce court also rejected the
argument that the Michigan Strikebreaker Act was intended to prevent violence. The court was able to find "no reason why this Act, as
written would prevent any violence," and maintained that the mere
assumption that the hiring of "professional strikebreakers" would
169. Id. at 783.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. The court declined to address the claims by an intervening defendant that the
entire Strikebreaker Act was pre-empted, because the broader issue was not before the court
on appeal. Id. at 783 n.6.
173. 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2887 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1984).
174. The Chamber of Commerce also sought to invalidate the Strikebreaker Act
on the ground that it violated the commerce clause and the privileges and immunities clause of the United States Constitution, and the equal protection and due process clauses of the Michigan Constitution. Id. at 2888. The court did not address
these claims.
175. Id. at 2889. See also MICH. CoMP. LAws. ANN. § 423.252 (West 1978).
176. 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2889.
177. Id.
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precipitate violence is insufficient to warrant a pre-emption exemption. 1781 Thus, the court
ruled that the entire Michigan Strikebreaker
17 9
Act is preempted.
These two Michigan cases illustrate that regulation short of outright prohibition, such as notice requirements in advertisements for
striker replacements, is no less vulnerable to pre-emption attacks.
Nor, as the court in Michigan Chamber of Commerce held, will the
fact that a statute is directed only at "professional strikebreakers"
vindicate such a law in the face of a pre-emption claim.
C. Illinois
Illinois' strike notice law requires that any employer advertisement for striker replacements state in such advertisement that a
strike or lockout is in progress at the employer's place of business. 180
In 1975 the Illinois Supreme Court held this law to be pre-empted,
affirming a lower court dismissal of a complaint brought against an
employer for violation of the statute.1 8 The court recognized that
the Illinois General Assembly might have enacted the statute to protect the public peace and order and avoid violence.18 2 It also noted
that a "truth in advertising" principle could have motivated the legislature.1 83 Nonetheless, the court, which found the statute inapplicable to the general public and operative solely during "acute" labor
disputes, held the statute to be void because it infringes on labor
activity which should be unrestrained. 84
178.

Id.

179. Id.
180. The law provides:
No employer shall advertise seeking to hire employees to replace employees on

strike or locked out during any period when a strike or lockout is in progress, which
strike or lockout has arisen out of a dispute between the management of the business and persons employed by such management at the time of such dispute who

strike or are locked out as the result of failure in settling such dispute, unless it shall
be stated in such advertisement that a strike or lockout is in progress at such place
of business.
ILL ANN. STAT, ch. 48, § 2c (Smith-Hurd 1969).
181.

People v. Federal Tool and Plastics, 62 I11.2d 549, 344 N.E.2d 1 (1975). Citing

Morton, the court explained that an employer's right to hire striker replacements
constitutes an important economic weapon left to the employer by Congress when it
struck the balance of power between labor and management. The statute requires
that notice that a strike is in progress be included in any advertisement for employees, and thus encumbers the employer's right to hire employees with a requirement
that he publicize the existence of the strike.
344 N.E.2d at 4.
182. 344 N.E.2d at 3.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 5.
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Illinois also has enacted a statute prohibiting the employment of
"professional strikebreakers."1 85 The Act both restricts employers
from hiring such "professional strikebreakers" during a strike, and
prohibits a "professional strikebreaker" from replacing a striker.18
In 1982 the Archer Daniels Midland Co. of Peoria, Illinois
hired non-union contractors to replace striking employees of union
contractors. The state's attorney filed suit against Archer Daniels
Midland in Illinois state court, claiming the company's action violated the Strikebreakers Act. The state's attorney then sought a declaratory judgment in federal district court that the statute withstood pre-emption. 187 The NLRB intervened as a defendant and
moved for summary judgment on the issue of pre-emption, which the
court granted. Citing People v. Federal Tool and Plastics, but without extensive further analysis, the court ruled that the anti-strikebreaker law was pre-empted because federal law delegated regulation of the conditions for replacement of strikers or locked out
employees to the NLRB. 18 8 The Seventh Circuit vacated the district
court's judgment, holding that the lower court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment on the validity of the
Illinois law, but did not address the merits of the preemption
question.18 9
D. Louisiana
Louisiana's anti-strikebreaker law has three principal aspects. It
prohibits the importation into the state of any person who is employed for the purpose of interfering by force or threats with peaceful picketing or employees' exercise of their other rights under the
labor laws.190 It proscribes recruitment of striker replacements by
185. A "professional strikebreaker" is defined in the Illinois Strikebreakers Act as any
person "who repeatedly and habitually offers himself for employment on a temporary basis
where a lockout or strike exists." ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 48, § 2e (Smith-Hurd 1969).
186. ILL ANN. STAT., ch. 48, § 2f (Smith-Hurd 1969) provides: "No person shall knowingly employ any professional strikebreaker in the place of an employee during any period
when a lockout or strike is in progress. Nor shall any professional strikebreaker take or offer to
take the place of employees involved in a lockout or strike."
187. People v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3320 (C.D. Il1.
1982).
188. Id. at 3321-22 (citing People v. Federal Tool & Plastics, 61111. 2d 549, 344 N.E.2d
1 (1975)). The court specified, however, that its decision did not apply to situations beyond the
jurisdiction of the NLRB. Id. at 3322 n.2.
189. People v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 704 F.2d 935 (7th Cir. 1983).
190. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:898 (West 1985) provides:
It is unlawful to transport or cause to be transported from without the State of
Louisiana into this state any person who is employed or is to be employed for the
purpose of obstructing or interfering by force or threats with
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third parties not directly involved in a labor dispute, 191 and it prohibits the importation into the state of any person for the purpose of

replacing a striking employee. 19 2
Several employers, who were served with subpoenas by the Louisiana Department of Labor during investigations into employment
of striker replacements, sought an injunction against the investigations. 19 3 The trial court found the second and third aspects194 of Louisiana's anti-strikebreaker law to be pre-empted by the federal labor
laws, but held that its first aspect'9 5 was a permissible exercise of
state jurisdiction. On appeal, the Louisiana Attorney General conceded the unconstitutionality of the Louisiana statutes' prohibition
on the recruitment and importation of striker replacements. How-

ever, he did defend the statute's proscription against the importation
of persons into the state for the purpose of interfering with picketing
96
or other lawful activity.
The Louisiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court and upheld the validity of that statute. It agreed with the trial judge's determination that the statute fit squarely within the local interest ex-

ception to the federal doctrine of pre-emption.

7

The court also

(i) Peaceful picketing by employees during any labor controversy affecting
wages, hours, or conditions of labor; or
(2) The exercise by employees of any of the rights of self-organization or collective bargaining.
Id.
191. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:901A (West 1985) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation, not directly involved in a
labor strike or lockout, to hire or recruit for employment any person, or to secure or
offer to secure for any person any employment, when the purpose or effect of such
hiring, recruiting, securing, or offering to secure employment, is to have such person
or another person take the place in employment of the striking employee in a business or industry where a labor strike or a lockout exists.
Id.

192.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:902 (West 1985) provides:
It is unlawful for any person, firm or corporation not directly involved in a labor
strike or lockout, to import or bring into Louisiana, or to send or transport into
Louisiana, or to arrange for or cause such importation or transportation into Louisiana, of any person for the purpose of such person taking the place in employment of
the striking employee in a business or industry where a labor strike or a lockout
exists.

Id.
193.

Warren v. Louisiana Dep't of Labor, 313 So. 2d 6 (La. Ct. App. 1975).
LA. REV.STAT. ANN. §§ 23:901-02.
LA. REv.STAT. ANN. § 23:898 (West 1985).
196. Warren, 313 So. 2d at 8.
197. The court explained: "[o]n its face, this statute deals with preservation of peace,
order and domestic tranquillity. We can perceive no matter more clearly within the concept of
an overriding state interest, or, in the Garmon language, more 'deeply rooted in local feeling

194.
195.
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rejected the argument that the statute was pre-empted by the Byrnes
Act, the federal statute prohibiting the interstate transportation of
strikebreakers in order to obstruct, by force or threats, lawful concerted activity. 198 It noted that while the doctrine of federal labor
law pre-emption prohibits state regulation that duplicates federal
law, state criminal laws often parallel federal laws. 199
V.

CURRENT ANTI-STRIKEBREAKER LAWS: AN APPRAISAL

Presently, state anti-strikebreaker laws remain unchallenged in
the vast majority of states. In order to consider the validity of these
laws in light of the pre-emption doctrine, the Machinists theory
must be applied. Unlike some means of employee self-help (such as
the right to strike) expressly sanctioned by the NLRA, the employer's right to engage in economic self-help has not been granted
by the NLRA, but can be said to have existed prior to the enactment
of that statute. 200 Consequently, the Garmon theory or pre-emption
is not applicable, since state anti-strikebreaker laws do not duplicate
or deny any rights expressly granted employers by the NLRA.
In those remaining states in which the constitutionality of the
anti-strikebreaker laws has not yet been litigated, anti-strikebreaker
statutes nonetheless appear quite vulnerable when subject to the Machinists theory of pre-emption. The Machinists theory, essentially
affirmed by a majority of the Court in New York Telephone, has two
basic premises: (1) state regulation which affects the balance of
power between management and labor is pre-empted unless Congress specifically has manifested a contrary intent; and (2) the mere
effect of interference by state regulation upon the exercise of ecoand responsibility ....

.' Id. at 9.

198. The Byrnes Act, provides:
Whoever willfully transports in interstate or foreign commerce any person who is
employed or is to be employed for the purpose of obstructing or interfering by force
or threats with (I) peaceful picketing by employees during any labor controversy

affecting wages, hours, or conditions of labor, or (2) the exercise by employees of
any of the rights of self-organization or collective bargaining; or

Whoever is knowingly transported or travels in interstate or foreign commerce for
any of the purposes enumerated in this section-

Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
This section shall not apply to common carriers.
18 U.S.C. § 1231 (1982).
199. Warren, 313 So. 2d at 10.
200. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316 (1965) ("a primary
purpose of the National Labor Relations Act was to redress the perceived imbalance of eco-

nomic power between labor and management, [and] it sought to accomplish that result by
conferring certain affirmative rights on employees and by placing certain enumerated restrictions on the activities of employers.") Id.
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nomic self-help by management and labor will give rise to a presumption of pre-emption, notwithstanding the state's intent to create
a law of "general applicability."20 1
Current state anti-strikebreaker laws may be grouped into four
classifications: (1) those that prohibit the hiring or referral of any
striker replacement; (2) those that regulate employment of "professional strikebreakers;" (3) those that regulate advertisements for
striker replacements or require advance notice to new hirees of the
existence of a labor dispute; and (4) those that prohibit recruitment
of strikebreakers for the purpose of interfering, by threats or violence, with lawful strike activity.
State laws that impose a blanket ban on the hiring, or referral
by third parties, of all striker replacements clearly appear to be preempted. Such laws directly interfere with the right of employers,
granted by Congress in the federal labor regulatory scheme, to hire
replacements for strikers. While restrictions upon third party referrals of striker replacements are not immediately directed at the
struck employer, such restrictions, as noted by the New Jersey Supreme Court, affect an employer's access to a supply of replacement
employees, particularly in industries where highly-skilled employees
are needed.20 2
State laws that regulate employment of "professional strikebreakers" or individuals who "customarily and repeatedly" act as
striker replacements similarly are quite vulnerable to a pre-emption
20 3
attack. Courts in two states have held such laws to be pre-empted.
While the assumption underlying such laws is that employment of
"professional strikebreakers" is more likely to lead to violence, a
Michigan court, as previously noted, rejected the asserted link between a prohibition of the hiring of "professional strikebreakers" and
the prevention of violence. 04 Thus, in order to sustain such a law, a
state would have to make a clear showing that the employment of
"professional strikebreakers" has in fact lead to violence in the state.
State laws requiring actual notice to potential striker replacements of the existence of a labor dispute likewise have been held preempted. Although these laws present a closer question, their invali201. See supra text accompanying notes 80-104.
202. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. State., 89 N.J. 131, 149-50, 445,
A.2d 353, 362 (1982).
203. See Michigan Chamber of Commerce v. State, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2887 (Mich.
Cir. Ct. 1984); People v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3320 (C.D. Ill.
1982).
204. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2889.
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dation appears consistent with the Supreme Court's present position
on pre-emption. Proponents of these laws argue that because the Supreme Court in Belknap, Inc. v. Hale0 5 permitted striker replacements to sue their employers for misrepresentation and breach of
contract arising out of the employment relationship, 0 6 states should
be free to take the positive step of preventing such mischief by regu207
lating the content of employer communications to replacements.
The state laws in this category, however, do not merely proscribe
misrepresentation or fraud, generally, 20° but are directed specifically
at employer action in labor disputes. Their immediate effect is to
make procurement of replacements in order to continue operating
during a strike more difficult for employers. Belknap held that an
employer may not use the federal labor laws to shelter itself from
claims brought under normal common law theories by innocent third
parties injured by acts of the employer, 20 9 but nothing in the case
suggests that states may impose statutory restrictions upon employers to prevent such claims from arising. The Court in Belknap, in
fact, reaffirmed the Machinists theory of pre-emption without modification.2 10 Belknap thus is of no aid to proponents of such notice
provisions.
Moreover, even if such laws were to be considered laws of "general applicability", it is likely that they still would not survive a preemption attack. A majority of Justices in New York Telephone rejected the plurality's attempt to create an exception to the Machinists doctrine for laws of "general applicability."2 1 Where such laws
have a direct impact upon the freedom of labor or management to
engage in economic self-help, they should be found to be pre-empted.
205. 463 U.S. 491, 103 S. Ct. 3172 (1983).
206. In Belknap, the employer repeatedly promised striker replacements that their employment status was permanent. The employer subsequently was charged with committing various unfair labor practices, and as part of a settlement of the charges with the NLRB, agreed
to reinstate all strikers. This necessitated the layoff of the striker replacements, who subsequently sued for breach of contract and misrepresentation. The Supreme Court held that the
federal labor laws did not pre-empt the replacements' state-court lawsuits, reasoning that an
employer should not be permitted to shelter itself in the federal labor laws from common law
actions brought by innocent striker replacements. Id. at 500, 103 S. Ct. at 3177-78.
207. Brief for Appellant at 9, UAW v. C.M. Smillie Co., No. 75941 (Mich., Feb. 12,
1985).

208. Cf.CoLo. REV. STAT. § 8-2-104 (1973) (obtaining workers through misrepresentation as to existence of labor dispute unlawful).
209. 463 U.S. at 500, 103 S.Ct. at 3177-78.
210.
211.

Id. at 500, 103 S. Ct. at 3177.
New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 546, (1979)

(Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at 547 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Id. at 551 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
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Finally, those state laws that on theirface prohibit the hiring or
importation of strikebreakers for the purpose of interfering, by
threats or violence, with lawful strike activity appear to be valid
under the pre-emption doctrine. 212 Such laws fit squarely within the
"local interest" exception to the pre-emption doctrine which permits
state regulation of violence and disturbances of the peace. Courts
have proven reluctant, however, to read state laws that only generally regulate the employment of striker replacements as dealing with
the prevention of violence.2 13 A state law must be explicit in its concern with prevention of violence in order to withstand scrutiny under
the pre-emption doctrine.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The development of the Machinists doctrine, a second doctrine
of federal labor law pre-emption, has left many state anti-strikebreaker laws extremely vulnerable to constitutional attack. The
trend in the state courts has been to invalidate as pre-empted by the
federal labor laws those laws that address the right of a struck employer to hire striker replacements but address the issue of preventing violence in only the most general of terms. This trend may be
expected to continue in the future as more constitutional challenges
are brought to invalidate these laws.

212. Warren v. Louisiana Dep't of Labor, 313 So. 2d 6 (La. Ct. App. 1975); Chamber
of Commerce of the United States v. State, 104 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2749 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1980),
afd in part and modified in part, 89 N.J. 131, 445 A.2d 353 (1982).
213. Chamber of Commerce, 89 N.J. 131, 445 A.2d 353; UAW v. C.M. Smillie Co.,
139 Mich. App. 731, 362 N.W.2d 780 (1984). But see People v. Archer Daniels Midland Co.,
704 F.2d 935, 942 (7th Cir. 1983) (suggesting in dictum that application of general antistrikebreaker law to situations involving picket line intimidation may be valid).
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